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The SPA-10 project, sponsored by U.S. National Science Foundation, 
is to acquire and qualify a replacement for the retired T-28 “storm 
penetration” aircraft previously used to acquire meteorological data 
to enable understanding and modelling of mid-continent 
thunderstorms. The National Science Foundation selected the 
Fairchild A-10 (bailed from the U.S. Air Force) as the platform to be 
adapted to perform the storm penetration mission to altitudes of 
eleven kilometers, and funded Naval Postgraduate School’s Center 
for Interdisciplinary Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Studies (CIRPAS) as 
prime contractor. An expert panel conducted a review of the SPA-10 
project in 2014 and recommended a risk analysis addressing hazards 
to the aircraft and pilots, such as icing, hail, turbulence and lightning. 
This paper presents the results of the risk analysis performed in 
response to this need, including recommended mitigations.
In general the A-10 aircraft systems and structure were shown to be 
robust and suitable, reinforced by an operational plan for incremental 
exposure to the full force of the storm. A key challenge was obtaining 
the necessary information to resolve the expert panel’s concerns for a 
military aircraft designed in the 1970’s, with significant upgrades 
since, for a radically different mission. The support and assistance of 
the USAF and the engine manufacturer, General Electric was critical 
to this endeavor. The participation of the operator of the previous 
storm penetration T-28 aircraft, the South Dakota School of Mines 
and Technology, was a crucial source for understanding the mission 
and operational environment.
Introduction
T-28 Aircraft: Storm Penetration Pioneer
The original “storm penetration” research platform was a 
modification of a T-28 Trojan, an aircraft designed and developed at 
North American Aviation in 1949 and produced through 1957 as an 
advanced trainer for the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. [1] 
A surplus T-28 was acquired by the South Dakota School of Mines 
and Technology (SDSM&T) in the early 1970’s and modified to 
accommodate instrumentation to measure meteorological conditions 
in “deep convective clouds” including the violent and destructive 
mid-continental thunderstorms occurring in the North American 
Midwest.
As described by Honomichl, Detwiler & Smith [2] (the source of the 
information in this section), “These modifications allowed the T-28 
storm-penetrating aircraft to fly through, and obtain microphysical 
observations within deep convective clouds, including severe 
thunderstorms that produced heavy hail, severe turbulence, extreme 
icing conditions, and lightning.” The primary T-28 modification was 
armoring vulnerable areas with heat treated aluminum reinforcements 
tested to withstand 7.62 cm hailstones, adding 700 pounds to the 
aircraft (about 10% of the original empty weight). Further mitigations 
for the hazards of storm penetration flights include: 
• Conductive canopy reinforcement 
• Lightning rods and static dischargers 
• Deicing the propeller & carburetor
Avoiding regions of high radar reflectance associated with hail 
diameter > 2.5 cm helped to preserve exposed instrumentation by 
reducing the probability of an encounter to 0.2%. Heavy hail is less 
common at higher altitudes above the 0° isotherm. [2]
Moderate to severe icing conditions were to be expected at all storm 
penetrations, corresponding to 2.5 cm ice accumulation during a 
passage through an updraft, usually either rime or mixed ice. 
(SDSM&T noted that the usual procedure to shed the ice buildup was 
to exit the storm and descend to warmer altitude.)
At the altitudes typical of T-28 storm penetrations (4 to 7 km) heavy 
and severe turbulence could be expected during 2% and 0.1% of the 
time in the cloud, respectively, and more so in the 4.7 to 5.7 km 
altitude range. This was apparently tolerable for the pilots.
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Lightning was not a serious threat, any strikes were conducted 
through the conductive aluminum structure, leaving small pits at the 
exit point. The mechanical aircraft controls were unaffected.
With these precautions, plus rigorous inspection and corrective 
maintenance of any indications of distress, SDSM&T performed 300 
storm penetrating flights over 32 years, accumulating 1700 deep 
convective cloud penetrations estimated to total over 1000 hours of 
exposure, all with the same airframe and no notable harm to the crew 
members.
In 2004 the SDSM&T T-28 was retired with the termination of 
National Science Foundation (NSF) funding, primarily due to limited 
altitude capability (7 km) and endurance [3], which constrained the 
scope of data collection.
The A-10 Storm Penetrating Aircraft Program
Figure 1. Fairchild A-10 Thunderbolt, a.k.a “Warthog” Note the positioning of 
the engine inlets relative to the inner wing section. https://img.planespotters.
net/photo/302000/original/80-0194-usaf-united-states-air-force-fairchild-a-
10c-thunderbolt-ii_PlanespottersNet_302341.jpg.
Starting in 2005, the scientific community considered options and 
launched studies for a plan to acquire and modify a more capable 
platform to build on the T-28 heritage, one with an 11 km ceiling, 
greater endurance, and more space and power for instruments and 
data collection. As early as 2008 the USAF A-10 was identified as a 
preferred platform and questions arose of its suitability for operation 
in the storm penetration environment with the hazards of hail, icing, 
turbulence and lightning.
In 2010 the National Science Foundation provided funding to the 
Center for Interdisciplinary Remotely Piloted Aircraft Studies 
(CIRPAS) to acquire a Fairchild A-10 aircraft by inter-service transfer 
within the Department of Defense, and modify it for airborne 
atmospheric research missions in collaboration with the Institute of 
Atmospheric Sciences at the South Dakota School of Mines and 
Technology. In 2013 the USAF delivered an A-10 to CIRPAS’s 
designated modification center, Zivko Aeronautics Inc., located in 
Guthrie Oklahoma. (This aircraft was immediately demilitarized by 
removing sensitive components, including all armament.)
An expert review panel was convened by NSF in 2013 & 2014, and 
reported dissatisfaction with the identification and mitigation of a 
number of issues, many safety related: airworthiness approval, adding 
engine inlet anti-ice, reviews & assessment of suitability considering 
turbulence, icing, hail, lightning (including fuel tank explosion), pilot 
physiology, and science operations, closer coordination with the 
USAF SPO and review prior relevant test reports and operational 
assessments. This included a call for analysis of risks to the aircraft, 
operations, science return and costs.
This paper reports the initial risk analysis performed during 2014 in 
response to this need, based on study of Honomichl, Detwiler & 
Smith [2] and discussions with the authors to understand the 
thunderstorm environment, T-28 operations and procedures, the 
Zivko team detailing the proposed A-10 modifications, analysis of 
A-10 mishap reports referencing to lightning, icing, and hail, and 
qualification test reports for the GE TF-34 turbofan engine.
Initial A-10 Storm Penetration Risk Analysis
Significant USAF Mishap Reports: 1994-2014
USAF A-10 Pilot Operational Procedures [3] states: 7.6.1. Do not 
attempt flight through severe weather; however, if unavoidable, prior 
to severe weather penetration, obtain separate clearances. If not 
feasible, flights may assume an in-trail formation with a minimum of 
1 NM separation between aircraft/elements. Obtain ATC clearance 
for a non-standard formation.
This order may have limited A-10 exposure to severe weather, but a 
significant sample of mishap records was obtained from the Air Force 
Safety Automated System (AFSAS) to glean information on the 
relevant hazards and consequences. The request was limited to 
hazards particularly relevant to storm penetration missions; icing 
conditions and ice ingestion, hail and lightning.
There were eighteen (18) AFSAS mishap reports of damage due to 
engine ice ingestion in the period 1994-2014, seven of which noted 
damage to both engines, and one also noting “low power”. These 
occurred in various locations in the United States, and in Germany, 
Afghanistan and Korea, and in all cases the A-10 was able to return to 
base with both engines operating. The damaged fan blades are 
replaceable in the field at acceptable cost, and these mishaps were 
rated as Class C or D. (For comparison, an engine ingestion of a 
turkey vulture in South Carolina in 2003 resulted in an uncontained 
fan blade failure and return to base on one engine, which was rated 
Class B.)
There were also six AFSAS mishap reports of hail damage, all 
reporting minor damage to slats or lights including one mishap report 
of a wing of six (6) aircraft all incurring similar hail & lightning 
damage, and one mishap report of a windscreen cracked by hail.
TF34-GE-100 Engine Qualification
General Electric provided the qualification reports for the A-10’s GE 
TF34-GE-100 turbofan engines, including the Official TF34 
Qualification Test Report [5]. The test results pertinent to the risks to 
the A-10 storm penetration mission are discussed below.
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Ice Ingestion Test
Mauch [7] details the Bird and Ice Ingestion Test, which includes the 
following ice ingestion test results: 
1. With fan rpm @ 6800 - 7000, sequentially introduce seven 
¼ inch sheets of ice: three @ 6”×4”, two at 9”×4” and two at 
18”×4”. Result: a total of eight curled blade tips with less than 
1% thrust loss. 
2. With fan rpm @ 1700 - 1900, fire three 1-inch hailstones 
sequentially @ 200 to 250 feet/sec. at blade pitch, tip and root, 
then @ 6800-7000 rpm fire another three 1-inch hailstones @ 
365-405 feet/sec. at spinner, blade tip and blade root. Result, no 
foreign object damage 
3. With fan rpm @ 1700 - 1900, fire three 2-inch hailstones 
sequentially @ 200 to 250 feet/sec. at blade pitch, tip and root, 
then at 6800-7000 rpm fire another three 2-inch hailstones @ 
365-405 feet/sec. at spinner, blade tip and blade root.
Note: 1” = 2.54 centimeters, ¼” = 0.62 centimeters
The foreign object damage (FOD) in these tests was limited to local 
deformation of fan blades and a dent in the spinner, with a loss of 
thrust less than 1%.
The A-10 has no wing or nacelle anti-ice or deicing provisions, unlike 
most similar commercial aircraft and the Navy S-3 aircraft, which 
also uses the GE T-34 turbofan. The sheet ice ingestion tests appear to 
be representative of the ingestion of ice expected to be released from 
the A-10’s wing after flight through icing conditions. The ¼” thick ice 
sheets tested appear light relative to the 2.5 cm (1”) icing thickness 
cited in Honomichl et al [2]. This needs to be watched in initial storm 
penetrations in light of the AFSAF mishap reports involving flight 
into icing.
The 5.08 cm (2”) diameter hailstone tests indicate a margin of safety 
relative to the 2.5 cm experience in Honomichl et al [2].
Environmental Icing Tests
The purpose of these tests was to qualify the TF34-GE-100 engine for 
flight in icing conditions. The General Electric Environmental Icing 
Test Report [6] details the setup, procedures and results of this test. 
The test setup did not include the aircraft nacelle, the icing conditions 
were created in an 8 foot diameter inlet plenum feeding directly to the 
engine inlet. Ice buildup in engine inlet was photographed during the 
runs, and in situ after shutdown.
Six test run conditions gave the following results: 
1. Idle at 5000’ altitude & 230 F, with a liquid water content of 2 
gm/cubic inch. 5 minutes of running gave a light to moderate 
clear ice buildup on the engine inlet. No issues. 
2. Operation at 25%, 43% & 51% maximum continuous power at 
5000’ altitude & 230 F, with a liquid water content of 2 gm/cubic 
inch. No ice buildup observed. 
3. Operation at idle & 25% maximum continuous power at 5000’ 
altitude & -40 F, with a liquid water content of 1 gm/cubic 
inch. Moderate milky ice buildup observed, no effect on engine 
running. 
4. Operation at 34% maximum continuous power at 5,000’ altitude 
& -40 F, with a liquid water content of 0.5 gm/cubic inch. Light 
to moderate milky ice buildup observed. 
5. Operation at 51% and maximum continuous power at 5,000’ 
altitude & -40 F, with a liquid water content of 0.5 gm/cubic 
inch. Light to moderate milky ice buildup observed. (Throttle 
chops & bursts reduce vibration.) 
6. Operation at maximum continuous power, 51% and idle at 
20,000’ altitude & -40 F, with a liquid water content of 0.5 gm/
cubic inch. Light ice buildup. There was one bent fan blade after 
the maximum continuous power run.
Turbulence and Lightning Considerations
Honomichl et al [2] provides a thorough treatment of turbulence, due 
to the strong updrafts and downdrafts in the heart of the storm. Since 
probing this regime is fundamental to storm penetration, this risk is 
hard to mitigate. However, as the A-10 wing loading is almost twice 
that of the T-28, the “g” forces on the pilot should be less. However, 
study of the turbulence effect on wing loading and structural life 
seems advisable considering the radical modification of the gun bay, 
and with respect to the cost of wing replacement due to cyclic 
loading.
Lightning was initially a contentious issue, but appears to be 
primarily managed by maintaining electrical bonding between all 
exterior panels to assure the integrity of the Faraday cage preventing 
electrical discharges within the fuselage. Early concerns on the 
possibility of lightning igniting the vapor in fuel tank ullage were 
captured in the assessment of this risk, pending confirmation of 
information that the wing fuel tanks have bladders and the fuselage 
fuel tanks are protected with reticulated plastic foam and self-sealing 
membranes, a common measure on military aircraft at risk of cannon 
fire.
Aircraft Icing and Hail Damage
The baseline conversion plan proposes to add de-icing to the inner 
wing leading edges to protect the engine fan blades from ice shed 
from the inner wing sections. This relates to a proposal to adopt a 
drooped leading edge on the inner wing sections, in development to 
allow removal of the existing inner wing leading edge slats. The 
baseline conversion program includes armoring wing and empennage 
leading edges. It may be effective to defer these measures until the 
basic conversion is cleared and initial storm penetration runs can 
assess the need.
The single AFSAS mishap report of hail cracking a pilot canopy 
suggests “armoring” similar to the SDSM&T T-28 canopy 
modifications.
Initial A-10 Program Risk Analysis
As requested by the A-10 Storm Penetrating Aircraft Review Panel 
Report [3], risk analysis was initiated following the Naval Syscom 
Risk Management Policy prescribed by NAVAIRINST 5000.21. [10] 
(The current NAVAIRINST 5000 issue was 21B, and draft of issue 
21C dated 10 December 19, 2014 was consulted and adopted.) The 
scope of the instruction covers risk identification, degraded technical 
performance, schedule and cost.
Downloaded from SAE International by University of Wisconsin - Madison  , Tuesday, February 14, 2017
Figure 2. SPA-10 Risk Analysis Matrix adapted from the Naval program risk 
reporting template in NAVAIRINST 5000.21B [10] for reporting “risk 
management status in terms of likelihood and consequence”.
Table 1. SPA-10 Likelihood Key for reporting risk management status in 
terms of likelihood used in the modified A-10 evaluations reported here. The 
likelihood level probabilities of occurrence seem appropriate for the risk 
incurred over one season of storm penetration missions.
At the time of the work reported here, late 2014 through Q1, 2015, 
comprehensive mission capabilities & technical requirements and a 
detailed modification schedule and cost had not been established. The 
focus was on system safety related technical performance risk 
identification and mitigation planning to guide the A-10 modification 
program definition through qualification of the demilitarized and 
modified A-10 configuration, including consideration of hazards to 
the planned instrumented mid-continent storm penetration proving 
trials, but not to the instrumentation payload.
Table A.1, Technical Performance Risk Assessments, in the appendix 
to this paper, details the information and considerations from which 
the consequence levels were defined. Since the emphasis was on 
system safety, the technical risks considered are system safety driven, 
and program schedule and cost were not considered.
Table2. NAVAIRINST 5000.21B [10] Consequences Key, utilized in reporting 
risk management status for technical performance in terms of consequence 
used in the modified A-10 evaluations reported here.
Conclusions & Recommendations
The reporting format was endorsed by the CIRPAS A-10 team as an 
effective tool to report the technical performance risk status.
Launching program risk analysis, assessment and reporting early in 
the program demonstrated its effectiveness in driving data collection 
and analysis that informs program planning and priorities, effectively 
driving out speculation with factual information.
Continued updating and extension of the risk management policy to 
assess all modifications and the full configuration of the proposed the 
storm penetration A-10 variant is recommended, including baseline 
cost and schedule impacts.
Given the favorable outcome of the technical performance risk 
assessment of the modified A-10, which is also pertinent to the 
baseline A-10, it is appropriate to consider and evaluate the option of 
graduated mid-continent storm penetration trials with an unmodified 
A-10, to explore the baseline capabilities and vulnerabilities to 
lightning, turbulence, icing, hail and other unknowns (e.g., 
unexpected flight crew hazards and performance limitations).
Identifying and assessing limitations and capabilities of the 
unmodified A-10 in the storm environment will eliminate unknowns, 
potentially exposing risks, and opportunities, overlooked to date, 
enabling mitigation of both recognized and unanticipated hazards, 
cost and program delays. These trials would also inherently address 
the effectiveness and suitability operational procedures, a class of risk 
highlighted by the NSF expert panel.
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APPENDIX
Purpose
The Center for Interdisciplinary Remotely Piloted Aircraft Studies (CIRPAS), a research center at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA (in 
collaboration with the Institute of Atmospheric Sciences at the South Dakota School of Mines and Technology) has been selected and directed by the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) to acquire an Fairchild A-10 aircraft by inter-service transfer within the Department of Defense, and modify it for 
airborne atmospheric research missions, replacing the capabilities of a modified T-28 aircraft retired a decade ago.
CIRPAS has taken possession of a serviceable A-10 provided by the USAF to be modified for service in mid-continent storm penetration missions. 
This aircraft has been selected to support a significant mission expansion to a maximum altitude of 11 kilometers from the T-28’s 7 km limit. Zivko 
Aeronautics has been contracted to design and implement the significant modifications required to de-militarize and convert the acquired A-10 to this 
mission. The USAF System Program Office (SPO) responsible for the A-10 has a considerable role in reviewing and approving the initial 
demilitarized A-10 configuration, including flight test and SPO airworthiness clearance.
This purpose of these tables was to initiate the implementation of a risk management process for the SPA-10 program, following the risk management 
policy prescribed by NAVAIRINST 5000.21. (The current NAVAIRINST 5000 issue is 21B, but a draft of issue 21C dated 10 December 19, 2014 
was also consulted.) The scope of this document covers technical risk identification, risk analysis & assessment and some elements of risk mitigation 
planning and implementation.
At the time of their preparation, early in 2015, comprehensive mission capabilities, complete technical requirements and a detailed modification 
program have not been defined. The focus was on system safety related program technical risk identification and mitigation planning to guide the 
A-10 modification program definition through qualification of the demilitarized A-10 configuration, including consideration of hazards to planned 
instrumented mid-continent storm penetration proving trials, but not to the instrumentation per se.
Figure 2 in the is the Program Risk Reporting Matrix prescribed by NAVAIRINST 5000.21 for reporting program risk management status in terms of 
likelihood and consequences for technical performance and program cost and schedule risk assessments. This format is used in this document as the 
designated tool to summarize the estimated technical risk status reported in the Table a.1 appended to this report. Since the emphasis is on system 
safety at this stage, the technical risks considered are system safety driven, and program schedule and cost are not addressed.
The SPA-10 Risk Reporting Matrix appears in Figure 2, and Table A.1 provides the technical risk analysis table used in preparing it.
Table A.1. Technical Performance Risk Assessments
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